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The Justice of Rawls' Original Position
STEVEN D. EALY
Western Carolina University

I
According to John Rawls , a theory of justice is a description of "our
sense of justice." 1 What does Rawls mean by "sense of justice"? What
is it, exactly , that a theory of justice is to describe? Our sense of justice
is "a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of
justice, at least to a certain minimum degree " ( 505).
It may be , then , that the description of our sense of justice will be
a psychological description, explaining to us the origins of this desire.
But the psychological explanation of this sense appears to be something
that Rawls seeks to overcome, rather than to use as a description. At
least this seems to be the case for a "well-ordered society" (514). 2
The description is not , then, psychological in nature, and neither is
it a mere cataloging of our currently accepted judgments and the reasons
that we adduce in their support. "Rather , what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which , when conjoined to our beliefs and
knowledge of the circumstances , would lead us to make these judgments
with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently" ( 46).
The function of a theory of justice , then, appears to be to make
explicit the already implicit kernel of all our judgments. While our
actions would be no different after we knew the hidden principles upon
which we have been acting all along, our "moral sensibility " would be
different, for it would now be characterized by "a conception of
justice" ( 46) .
Rawls , however, is not interested in determining the principles
that form the hidden nucleus of our everyday , real-life , actions; that
would explain only our everyday , real -life , sense of justice. "From the
standpoint of moral philosophy," Rawls argues ,
1 John Rawls, A Theof'!J af Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971), p. 46. All unidentified numbers within this paper refer to the page numbers
in this book. Although Rawls indicates that this understanding of what a theory
of justice is provisional, he does not revise that und erstanding later in the book.
2 Rawls does present a three-stage "psychology of moral development" ( 462-79).
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the best account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which
fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice,
but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective
equilibrium ( 48).
While there are various interpretations of "reflective equilibrium,"
questions of moral philosophy are concerned with the case in which "one
is to be presented with all possible descriptions to which one might
plausibly conform one's judgments together with all relevant philosophical arguments for them" ( 49). Once one is confronted with these
descriptions and arguments and has examined them, has matched principles with descriptions, descriptions with arguments, and arguments with
principles-once one has done all of this and has separated the wheat
from the chaff, the sheep from the goats, and the wise virgins from the
foolish-so that one's "principles and judgments coincide ... and [one]
know[s] to what principles [one's] judgments conform and the premises
of their derivation" ( 20), then one has arrived at "reflective equilibrium"
( 49).
Rawls is reasonable, however, and he does admit that "it is doubtful whether one can ever reach this state" ( 49; cf. 21). Because we cannot achieve reflect equilibrium by direct assault , Rawls decides to use
a flanking maneuver and turning movement to arrive at the principles
necessary for the description of our moral sense from the rear. To
accomplish this task Rawls intoduces a particular form of the social
contract ( 11) which he calls "the original position" ( 12-14, 118ff.).
According to Rawls , "the original position is a purely hypothetical
situation. " He continues: "The conception of the original position is not
intended to explain human conduct except insofar as it tries to account
for our moral judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of
justice" ( 120). The principles of justice necessary for the description
of our sense of justice will be derived from this original position (17-22,
118-26).

II
The original position is "a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice " ( 12). In the
original position certain persons will select the principles of justice which
will apply to the foundations of society. This position is characterized
by two main features: the rationality of the parties involved ( 142ff)
and the veil of ignorance ( 136-42).
The individuals in the original position are rational, that is, they
will attempt to acknowledge principles which advance their "system of
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ends as far as possible" ( 144). These persons define their system of
ends in accordance with Rawls' account of "primary social goods" (142).
Primary goods are "things that every rational man is presumed to want.
These goods normally have a use whatever a peron's rational plan of
life" (62). 3 Among primary social goods would be "rights and liberties,
powers and opportunity, income and wealth" ( 62). The rationality of
persons in the original position is thus defined by their preference for
more primary social goods rather than less.
These rational persons will meet together and select, from a list of
possible alternative principles, those principles of justice which "are to
apply to the basic structure of society" ( 118-26, 250). Since each of
these people is going to attempt to take as much of primary social goods
for himself as possible, there is the danger that each person will vote on
the principles of justice out of sheer self-interest. This possibility creates
a problem for Rawls (18-19).
In the original position all are guided by self-interest, but all do
not necessarily have the same abilities . Those with greater abilities or
with better social position will be better able to secure those goods that
all desire. This aspect of the social world, however, "seems arbitrary
from a moral point of view" ( 15). It is to overcome this arbitrariness
that the veil of ignorance is introduced. The veil of ignorance "ensures
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles
by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances" ( 12). The principles chosen from behind the veil of ignorance
will be fair, because no one will be able to design principles to favor
his particular condition.
Behind the veil of ignorance men know general facts about human
society, but certain specific facts are hidden. No one in the original
position knows his place in society, his social class, or his economic
standing. While all of the people in the original position belong to the
same generation, no one knows to which generation they belong. A
person in the original position knows nothing about his physical or
intellectual abilities, nor does he know his conception of the good or
of his rational plan of life ( 137).
These persons in the original position "do not know, of course, what
their religious or moral convictions are, or what is the particular content
of their moral or religious obligations as they interpret them. Indeed,
they do not know that they think of themselves as having such obligations" ( 206) .
3

But th.is is not always the case ( 142).
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Even though these people do not know what their beliefs are, or
how those beliefs fare in society, or even that they hold any religious
beliefs or obligations, they are not allowed to "take chances" with their
beliefs by agreeing to the dominance of one religion in society, for
"to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one's religion
or moral convictions seriously" ( 207).
Rawls says candidly that "we want to define the original position
so that we get the desired solution" (141). 4 The "desired solution"
of which Rawls is speaking is the acceptance of the two principles of
justice that come out of the original position. These principles will now
be stated briefly.
The original position is set up so that no one individual can win
special privileges for himself and also so that he has no reason to accept
any special disadvantages either. "Since it is not reasonable for him to
expect more than an equal share in the division of social goods, and
since it is not rational for him to agree to less, the sensible thing for
him to do is to acknowledge as the first principle of justice one requiring
an equal distribution" ( 150).
Thus Rawls' first principle of justice can be formulated as follows:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all ( 302 ) .
While the first principle of justice points toward equality, these
may be cases in which inequality leads to the betterment of society in
general and of the disadvantaged in particular ( 151) . Considerations
such as these lead to Rawls' second principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity ( 302) .
• The original position developed by Rawls "has been defined so that it is a
situation in which the maximin rule applies" ( 155). The "maximin rule for choice
under uncertainty" applies to situations in which no rational estimate of probable
outcome can be made, the person making the choice is concerned with a minimum
standard of good, and certain alternative ( 152-54) choices have completely unacceptable outcomes.
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III
I wish to consider, not the principles of justice he argues would be
chosen in the original positions but rather the use that Rawls makes
of the original position itself. It seems to me that Rawls places great
importance on the original position in both determining ( 122-26) and
justifying ( 17-21) the principles selected. To the extent that there are
problems with the method of selection and justification for the principles
of justice, the validity of those principles as a description of our sense of
justice becomes problematic.
The two principles are justified because they would be the principles
chosen in the original position; that is, these principles would be chosen
as the principles of justice by hypothetical persons in a hypothetical
social contract agreement ( 11-12, 118-21). These are the correct principles of justice because "their acknowledgement is the only choice consistent with the full description of the original position" ( 121 ) . Rawls
is firm and precise on this point: "If a conception of justice would be
agreed to in the original position, its principles are the right ones to
apply" ( 167). 5
By the same token, other conceptions of justice, and their principles,
must be rejected if they would not be accepted in the original position.
For example, the principle of perfection, in any of its many forms ( 325),
is rejected because it would not be accepted by the persons in the
original position since it would violate the principle of equal liberty
( 327-28). As the interpretation of the original position changes, however , so do the principles of justice:

In order to arrive at the ethic of perfectionism, we should have
to attribute to the parties a prior acceptance of some natural duty,
say the duty to develop human persons of a certain style and
aesthetic grace , and to advance the pursuit of knowledge and the
Rawls' use of the original position sounds like Kant's discussion of duty . "It
moral worth and
beyond all comparison the highest-namely,
that he does good, not from inclination,
but from duty" (Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphy sic of ,Morals [New
York, 1964], p . 66). Rawls indicates that his principl es of justice are categorical
imperatives in Kant's sense ( 253). But the categori cal imperative for Kant posits
a universal law, universal for not only man but every rational being ( Kant, 76, 98).
Rawls' principles, however, are "universal" only in a univ erse based on his original
position, and he himself admits that his principles would probably not be chosen
from a complet e list of alternatives ( 581). It is perhaps possible to read Rawls' use
of the original po sition along th e lines indicated by Kant: the principles are for
"grounding philosophy on metaphysics ," and the use of th e original position is for
"winning acceptanc e for it by giving it a popular character after it has been established" ( Kant, 77).
Ii

is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show-a
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cultivation of the arts . But this assumption would drastically alter
the interpretation of the original position ( 328; cf. 121-22).
The principles of justice are justified through their attachment to
the original position. Rawls' theory of justice then, relies in crucial
aspects on the proper interpretation of the original position. Because
of the importance of the original position, in developing this original
position and the principles of justice which spring from it, "we should
strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name
connotes" ( 121 ) .
The first problem that one faces in this task of moral geometry
is that he is confronted with a jumbled maze of potential original
positions: "There are indefinitely many variations of the initial situation
and therefore no doubt indefinitely many theorems of moral geometry"
(126).
How does one move from this mass of conflicting "initial situations"
to the two principles identified above? According to Rawls, "for each
. . . conception of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial
situation in which its principles are the preferred solution" ( 121).
Notice however that the two two principles of justice are determined,
not by an "initial situation," but by the original position." One of many
"initial siuations" must somehow be converted into the "original position."
To arrive at the principles of justice one must select, out of all the
possible alternatives, that description of the initial situation which will
lead to them. This process is crucial , for a wrong selection of original
position will lead to an incorrect set of principles, which will lead to an
erroneous description of our sense of justice, which will lead in tum to
an incorrect theory of justice.
There are two stages to the selection of and justification for choosing
one of the initial situations as the original position: "The question of
justification is settled, as far as it can be, by showing that there is one
interpretation of the initial situation that best expresses the conditions
that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles
yet which, at the same time, leads to a conception that characterizes
our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. This most favored,
or standard, interpretation I shall refer to as the original position"
( 121 ).
Rawls speaks, first of all, of that interpretation of the initial situation
"which best expresses those conditions that are widely thought reasonable." Later in the same paragraph Rawls calls this interpretation "phil-
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osophically most favored" ( 122). This interpretation is, for Rawls, "the
original position": "The concept of the original position, as I shall refer
to it, is that of the most philosophically favored interpretation of this
initial choice situation for the purposes of a theory of justice" ( 18).
The "philosophically favored interpretation" of the initial situation
is the one which sets conditions that "are widely thought reasonable "
( 121), and in fact "must be characterized by stipulations that are widely
accepted " (14; cf. 18, 584). Rawls does make an effort to show that
his original position is made up of such widely accepted stipulations
and states that "one should not be misled ... by the somewhat unusual
conditions which characterize the oiginal position" ( 18).
The "somewhat unusual conditions" become obvious as Rawls
develops this "widely accepted" original position. He states that it "seems
reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged
or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice
of principles" ( 18). He states that "it also seems widely agreed that
it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's
own case" ( 18). Notice the next sentence, however: 'We should insure
further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted" ( 18). Rawls
does not claim that this idea is widely accepted, nor even that it is
reasonable. "The aim," he says, "is to rule out those principles that it
would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little chance of
success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the
standpoint of justice" ( 18).
Rawls sets this limitation, not because of its obvious reasonableness or its general acceptance. He sets this stipulation to insure that a
"rational" alternative-an alternative which is potentially incompatible
with his principles of justice-may not even be considered. Rawls states
very clearly this method of operation: "We want to define the original
position so that we get the desired solution" ( 141 ) .
We now turn briefly to the most unusual of Rawls' "somewhat unusual conditions "; the veil of ignorance. "Among the essential features
of this situation," writes Rawls,
is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social
status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence , strength, and the like.
I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions
of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance ( 12; cf. 136ff).

THE JusTICEOF RAWLS'OrucINALPosrnoN

27

Rawls does not claim that the veil of ignorance is "widely thought
reasonable ," but that "the veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that
something like it must have occurred to many " (137). Whether natural
or unnatural , reasonable or unreasonable, widely accepted or widely
rejected , Rawls' reason for positing the veil of ignorance is clear: "the
arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situation" ( 141 ) .
The argument for the original position based on wide acceptance,
in a way begs the entire question. If one could arrive at the state of
reflective equilibrium, and the principles of justice , without developing
the original position, there would be no reason to introduce the notion
of "original position." If , on the other hand, one needs this concept to
assist one in constructing a theory of justice , wide or narrow acceptance
seems to be immaterial. It is certainly immaterial if the acceptance required is that of men in general, for men in general do not have considered judgments on these questions ( 47-8). Perhaps however Rawls,
by calling the original position the "most philosophically favored," intends to indicate that wide acceptance on the part of philosophersmen who do have considered judgments-determines
which of all possible alternatives leads to the true principles of justice. This is, to say
the least, a difficult position to hold, since the various alternatives under
consideration stem from various of these same philosophers ( 123-24).
Rawls makes no effort to estabilsh that his original position is "philosophically most favored" ( nor does he explain exactly what "philosophically most favored" means). He posits this statement rather than
proving it. He does not show that it is widely accepted as reasonable,
but merely states that it is, which is not the same thing at all.
It is clear that Rawls produces no evidence to prove that there
is general acceptance of the original position, which he has outlined as
the reasonable position. To say this, however, is not to say that the
original position is unreasonable. This question can be considered in
two ways: ( 1) does the use of the original position argument add to
the reasonablesness of Rawls' case? 6 and ( 2) are the arguments adduced
by Rawls reasonable, whether widely accepted or not? Simply put, given
the framework which Rawls chooses, does he make a convincing case?
The question last raised is best considered by looking toward the
second of Rawls' two methods of justification. We can justify selecting
one interpretation of the initial situation as the original position by
6 I shall not consider this aspect of the question. See Ronald Dworkin, "The
Original Position," The University of Chicago Law Review, XL ( 1973), 500-33.
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choosing the one which "leads to our considered judgments in reflective
equilib1ium " ( 121) .
The game works as follows: one determines which principles of
justice one accepts ("considered judgments"), and then one builds an
original position that will insure the desired outcome-"one tries to set
out the different conditions embodied in the contractual situation in
which their princples would be chosen " ( 122). One then justfies-"as
far as it can be done " ( 121 )-the selection of that particular initial
situation because it coincides with his "considered judgments." Then
one claims that whatever principles selected must be followed, for "if
a conception of justice would be agreed to in the original position, its
principles are the right ones to apply" ( 167).
Earlier I quoted Rawls as speaking about certain considerations
"irrelevant from the standpoint of justice" ( 18) . But to know what is
"irrelevant" from that standpoint is to know something , perhaps a great
deal , about justice. Rawls is involved in tailoring his original position
to arrive at the principles he already accepts ( 141). If it is a problem
of saving , simply "alter the motivational assumption" ( 128, 140). How
can the principle of "equal liberty of conscience" be insured? Posit that
one must take seriously their religious and moral beliefs, even if they
do not know what those beliefs are ( 207).
Rawls begins his discussion of equal liberty of conscience by stating
his conclusion: "The question of equal liberty of conscience is settled.
It is one of the fixed points of our considered judgments of justice"
(208). To requote a passage referred to earlier in this paper: "We want
to define the original position so that we get the desired solution" ( 141).
If the claim of circularity is correct, 7 then Rawls ' argument from
the original position ultimately fails. He recognizes this problem to some
extent when he admits that his work is "highly intuitive" ( 121; cf. 124,
584). Perhaps in the long run all reasoning is circular ,8 with the difference being the diameter of the various orbits. More important that the
charge of circularity is the charge of sterility , which will now be
briefly examined .
7 Other problems of circularity arise in Rawls' theory . In his theory, he says,
"the concept of right is prior to that of the good" ( 31) . Yet later Rawl~ writes that
"something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of
right already on hand. But to establish these principl es it is necessary to rely on some
notion of goodness, for we need assumption about the parties' motives in the original
position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept
of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials" ( 396). Rawls call this the "thin theory" of justice.
Thick or thin, it still' presents a problem for Rawls. Also see 433-34.
8 -Republic, 533 b-d.
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IV
What began as an effort to describe "our sense of justice" has arrived
at the point of "a purely hypothetical situation" which will be used to
explain our very real sense. Rawls indicates the reason for this in a
comparison of moral theory ( of which the theory of justice is a part)
with social theory:
For while the theory of price, say, tries to account for the movements of the market by assumptions about the actual tendencies at
work, the philosophically favored interpretation of the initial situation incorporates conditions which it is thought reasonable to impose
on the choice of principles. By contrast with social theory, the aim
of moral theory is to characterize this situation so that the principles
that would be chosen, whatever they tum out to be, are acceptable
from a moral point of view ( 120).
Moral theory is not concerned with "the actual tendencies at work"
in the normal, everyday , judgments discussed earlier . Moral theory is

concerned simply with what Rawls calls "a moral point of view." It is
such a theoretical position that allows Rawls to "look for a conception
of justice that nullifies the accidents of natural endowments and the
contingencies of social circumstance" because they are "arbitrary" ( 15).
While there are perhaps many difficulties with this position, I want
to indicate now only one. Principles of justice that are derived from
abstract reasoning that is not tied into actual human life, activity and
thought may in some way become highly questionable when applied to
that life, activity, and thought.
Rawls holds that actual institutions are to be judged in light of the
principles of justice derived from the original position, and that those
actual institutions are to be considered unjust insofar as they depart
from the ideal conception of justice ( 246). But Rawls is forced to admit
that in fact this position is highly problematic. Speaking of his ideal
conception of justice , Rawls states:
By putting th ese principles in lexical order , the parties are choosing
a conception of justice suitable for favorable conditions and assuming that a just society can in due course be achieved. Arranged
in this order, the principles define then a perfectly just scheme;
they belong to ideal theory and set up an aim to guide the course
of social reform. But even granting the soundness of these principles
for this pu rpo se, we must still ask how well they apply to institutions
under less than favorable conditions , and whether they provide any
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guidance for instances of injustice. The principles and their lexical
order were not acknowledged with these situations in mind and so
it is possible that they no longer hold ( 245).
To state that Rawls does not follow Plato is not to refute Rawls'
position. But it is to indicate that his work does not have the political
vitality that is found in the Republic: the understanding of how political
men and institutions act. While political philosophy cannot end with the
city, that is where it should at least begin. Rawls, to an extent, recognizes this: "The fundamental principles of justice quite properly depend
upon the natural facts about men in society" ( 159). He begins his book
by reflecting that "a society is well-ordered . . . when it is effectively
regulated by a public conception of justice" which "everyone accepts"
( 4-5). He also indicates that "existing societies are ...
seldom wellordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute"
( 5).
In addition, Rawls would like for his work to move the existing
political structure toward a more just structure ( 246, 303). But, by
identifying important political considerations as irrelevent and arbitrary
aspects of the social world from a moral point of view ( 18), Rawls
effectively cuts off his moral theory from the real political groundings
that it needs. Rawls argues that "the arbitrariness of the world must be
corrected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual
situation" ( 141). But, in arbitrarily adjusting his theory of justice to
fit his considered judgments, he removes himself from the political
Lebenswelt, which is irrevocably tied to the "arbitrariness of the world."
But the relation of the political philosopher to politics has long
been problematic. 9 The political philosopher has always had an easier
time communicating with other minds than with political men. 10
Rawls attempts to justify his original position as the "one interpretation of the intial situation which best expresses the conditions that are
widely thought reasonable" ( 121 ) . This argument is a rhetorical effort
to communicate with political men. The serious argument made by
Rawls, as he himself acknowledges, is that his interpretation is reasonable (582), and this argument communicates with other minds. Unfortunately Rawls stipulates rather than proves this reasonableness.
Rawls states early on that, "for the purposes of this book, the views
of the reader and the author are the only ones that count" ( 50). Just
9

Republic 488a-489d, 519b-52ld.

lOLeo Strauss, Persecution and the Art af Writing (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 1952.), pp. 22-37.
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as moral philosophy is Socratic ( 48 ), so is Rawls' book an attempt
Socratic education: the opening of a dalogue between two minds. If,
the long run , Rawls fails in this effort, it is because that, while
remembers the Socratic principle that "the fundamental principles
justice quite properly depend upon the natural facts about men
society" ( 159), he does not remember it enough .
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